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ABSTRACT 
The advent of the digital era and the global market pose unique 
challenges to intellectual property law.  To adapt, U.S. patent laws 
require constant interpretation in the face of rapidly changing 
technological advances.  In AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., the 
Federal Circuit interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) in a technology-
dependent manner in order to effectuate the purpose of the law with 
respect to global software distribution.  However, the Federal 
Circuit failed to consider the presumption against extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law, and its decision now risks international 
discord and harm not only to the American software industry, but 
other U.S. industries as well.  This iBrief critiques the lower court 
decisions in AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. in light of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, and analyzes how the 
Supreme Court should apply the presumption in its review of the 
case. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 The requirements for establishing infringement of a U.S. patent are 
stated in § 271 of the United States Patent Act.2  While § 271(a) establishes 
the basis for patent infringement within the United States, § 271(f) sets out 
the conditions for liability where inventions patented in the United States 
are exported.3  The broad language of the provision raises several questions 
                                                     
1 J.D. Candidate, 2008, Duke University School of Law; Ph.D. in Molecular 
Biology, Cornell University Weill Graduate School of Medical Sciences; B.Sc. 
in Biological Sciences with Honors in Molecular Genetics, University of 
Alberta.  The author is extremely grateful to Professors Arti Rai and Jerome 
Reichman for informative discussions. 
2 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). 
3 Id. § 271(a), (f).  Section 271(f) states:  
(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied 
in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the 
components of a patented invention, where such components are 
uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively 
induce the combination of such components outside of the 
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that courts have attempted to clarify in the twenty years since § 271(f)’s 
enactment.4  Some issues courts have wrestled with include determining the 
scope of “component,” the nature of conduct that constitutes “supplying” 
from the United States, and whether liability under § 271(f) attaches 
differently depending on the technological nature of the patent.5  In 
attempting to resolve these issues, the Federal Circuit, in its recent decision 
in AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,6 expanded the scope of § 271(f) by 
interpreting the provision to have extraterritorial effects.  The Federal 
Circuit’s expansive interpretation of § 271(f) risks disrupting the well-being 
of the U.S. software industry and, more significantly, the role the United 
States plays in the international scheme of intellectual property 
enforcement.   
¶2 This iBrief addresses the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of § 271(f) 
in AT&T v. Microsoft, where it held: (1) that for the purposes of § 271(f), 
software code could be a component of a patented invention, and (2) that 
liability for infringement attaches to copies of such software made abroad 
and used in a manner that would infringe on a patented invention if the 
conduct occurred in the United States.7  Part I summarizes the enactment 
and subsequent judicial interpretation of § 271(f), describing the Federal 
Circuit’s recent trend of interpreting the statute broadly.  Part II outlines the 
facts, procedural history and lower court decision in AT&T v. Microsoft and 
the arguments presented by the parties before the Supreme Court.  Part III 
expands on the principles of comity and national treatment underlying the 
                                                                                                                       
United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such 
combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as 
an infringer.  
(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied 
in or from the United States any component of a patented 
invention that is especially made or especially adapted for use in 
the invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce 
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component 
is uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such component 
is so made or adapted and intending that such component will be 
combined outside of the United States in a manner that would 
infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the 
United States, shall be liable as an infringer. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
4 Alex Cartove, Activities that Occur Outside the U.S. May Result in Liability for 
Infringement of a U.S. Patent: AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp, 414 F.3d 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2005), MORRISON FOERSTER, LEGAL UPDATES & NEWS, April 2006, 
http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/update02178.html.   
5 Id. 
6 AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. 
granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2006). 
7 Id. at 1369–70. 
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current international intellectual property system and elaborates on how the 
presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law stems from and 
supports these principles.  Discussion focuses on both the basis of the 
presumption in the separation of powers doctrine and institutional 
competence of the individual branches of the federal government and the 
potential international and national repercussions of the Federal Circuit’s 
decision.  Part IV concludes by suggesting how the Supreme Court should 
consider these principles in its review of AT&T v. Microsoft and 
recommends that the Court apply the presumption against extraterritoriality, 
interpreting § 271(f) conservatively in the absence of Congressional intent 
to do otherwise, so as to avoid international discord and economic harm to 
industry. 
I. THE HISTORY OF 35 U.S.C. § 271(F) 
¶3 Section 271(f) of Title 358 was enacted by Congress in response to 
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,9 a case that exposed an 
exploitable loophole for patent infringement.10  In Deepsouth Packing, a 
manufacturer of shrimp deveining machines successfully avoided liability 
for patent infringement by manufacturing only components of the machines 
in the United States and then shipping the components abroad for final 
assembly.11  Because the patents at issue were combination patents, 
infringement could only occur once the various components were 
assembled, which in this case was abroad.12  At the time of Deepsouth 
Packing, only § 271(a)–(c) had been enacted and it was clear that the 
manufacture and use of a patented device outside the United States was not 
an infringement under U.S. patent law.13  Despite the obvious exposure of 
U.S. patent holders to infringement, the Supreme Court refused to expand 
the reach of § 271 to acts conducted abroad without “a clear and certain 
signal from Congress.”14  The Court recognized that its precedent strongly 
emphasized the territoriality of U.S. patent law and that only Congress had 
the constitutional authority to legislate with respect to the extraterritorial 
effects of U.S. law.15 
                                                     
8 35 U.S.C. § 271(f). 
9 406 U.S. 518 (1972). 
10 AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1371. 
11 Deepsouth Packing, 406 U.S. at 523–24.  Assembly of the machine’s 
components was very simple and the manufacturer referred to the components 
as the “machine” in its instructions and correspondence with customers. 
12 Id. at 528–29. 
13 Id. at 527 (discussing Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 
U.S. 641, 650 (1915), Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856)). 
14 Id. at 531. 
15 Id. at 527, 530—31. 
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¶4 In response to Deepsouth Packing, Congress enacted § 271(f) to 
expand the reach of Title 35 and close its exposed infringement loophole to 
address the domestic impact of foreign sales of U.S.-patented inventions.16  
The legislative history referred to § 271(f) as a “housekeeping-oriented 
measure” enacted to “prevent copiers from avoiding U.S. patents by 
supplying components of a patented product in this country so that the 
assembly of the components may be completed abroad.”17 
¶5 Initially the courts were relatively conservative in interpreting the 
reach of § 271(f), emphasizing the expressed Congressional intent and the 
plain meaning of statutory text.18  Two cases, Waymark Corp. v. Porta 
Systems Corp.19 and Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc.,20 illustrate the 
Federal Circuit’s concern for both Congressional intent and the territorial 
aspect of U.S. patent law.  In Waymark, the Federal Circuit held that “the 
statutory language in [§ 271(f)(2)] does not require an actual combination of 
the components [abroad], but only a showing that the infringer shipped 
them with the intent that they be combined.”21  Thus, liability “attaches 
with mere shipment of the component from the United States and does not 
consider the presence or absence of acts occurring abroad.”22  While this 
holding made it easier to sue for infringement under § 271(f), the Federal 
Circuit reinforced the territoriality of U.S. patent law by explaining that 
“[i]f 271(f)(2) required actual assembly abroad, then infringement would 
depend on proof of infringement in a foreign country . . . rais[ing] the 
difficult obstacle of proving infringement in foreign countries and pos[ing] 
the appearance of giving extraterritorial effect to United States patent 
protection.”23  In Pellegrini, the Federal Circuit found that § 271(f) was 
“clear on its face. . . . It applies only where components of a patent 
invention are physically present in the United States and then either sold or 
                                                     
16 AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. 
granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2006) (discussing 130 Cong. Rec. 28069 
(daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (Congressional debate on Patent Law Amendments Act 
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383)).   
17 Id. 
18 See Virginia Zaunbrecher, Eolas, AT&T & Union Carbide: The New 
Extraterritoriality of U.S. Patent Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 33, 37–42 
(2006) (discussing the cautious approach of the courts in deciding several cases 
after § 271(f)’s enactment).  
19 245 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
20 375 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
21 Waymark, 245 F.3d at 1368. 
22AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1373 (Rader, J., dissenting) (discussing 
Waymark, 245 F.3d at 1368, as an example of the territorial focus and 
application of § 271(f) and U.S. patent law in general). 
23 Waymark, 245 F.3d at 1365 (citations omitted); see Zaunbrecher, supra note 
18, at 41–42. 
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exported.”24  As such, “the language of § 271(f) clearly contemplates that 
there must be an intervening sale or exportation; there can be no liability 
under § 271(f)(1) unless components are shipped from the United States for 
assembly.”25  Even though the defendant in Pellegrini supplied instructions 
for the production and disposition of components of a patented invention 
and provided corporate oversight from its U.S. headquarters, thus 
facilitating the production of infringing products, the Federal Circuit refused 
to attach liability to its conduct under § 271(f) because the components were 
never physically present in the United States.26  In an axiomatic closing, the 
Court cites Dowagiac Manufacturing Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co. to 
emphasize that “the right conferred by a patent under our law is confined to 
the United States and its territories, and infringement of this right cannot be 
predicated on acts wholly done in a foreign country.”27 
¶6 More recently, however, several Federal Circuit decisions have 
significantly expanded the scope of § 271(f).  In March of 2005, the Federal 
Circuit held in Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. that software 
code encoded on master disks and exported abroad falls within the scope of 
“components” in § 271(f).28  The case involved Microsoft’s supply of its 
Windows operating system bundled with Internet Explorer to licensed 
foreign computer manufacturers via “golden master discs.”29  Eolas alleged 
that certain aspects of Microsoft’s Internet Explorer software infringed one 
of its software patents30 and sought damages for infringement from 
Microsoft for its foreign sales under § 271(f).31  Microsoft argued that 
software code was not a “component” under the auspices of § 271(f) 
because a “component” must be a tangible element like the shrimp 
deveining machine components in Deepsouth Packing.32  The Federal 
Circuit disagreed based on a plain interpretation of the statutory language, 
lack of clear Congressional prohibition preventing the inclusion of software 
within the meaning of “component” under § 271(f), and sound doctrinal 
                                                     
24 Pellegrini, 375 F.3d at 1117 (emphasis added). 
25 Id. 
26 Id.  at 1115, 17. 
27 Id.  at 1119 (discussing Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 
U.S. 641, 650 (1915)). 
28 Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1338–41 (Fed. Cir. 
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 568 (2005). 
29 Id. at 1331 (“Golden master disk[]” is the name given to the single master 
copy of the software shipped to each manufacturer for use in making subsequent 
copies of the software that will then be installed on computers.)  Eolas has very 
similar facts to AT&T v. Microsoft.  See infra Part II.A. 
30 U.S. Patent No. 5,838,906 (filed Oct. 17, 1994) (issued Nov. 17, 1998). 
31 Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1331–32. 
32 Id at 1340. 
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policy.33  The Federal Circuit reasoned that the “statutory language did not 
limit § 271(f) to patented ‘machines’ or patented ‘physical structures’ . . . or 
to ‘machine’ components or ‘structural or physical’ components.”34  The 
Federal Circuit was also swayed by the fact that “[e]xact duplicates of the 
software code on the golden master disk are incorporated as an operating 
element of the ultimate device . . . [and the code] in effect drives the 
‘functional nucleus of the finished computer product.’”35  Four months 
later, the Federal Circuit decided AT&T v. Microsoft, the subject matter of 
this iBrief, where it both affirmed its holding in Eolas and further expanded 
it by attaching liability under § 271(f) to the foreign-made copies of 
software installed on foreign-made computers that are sold abroad.36  Three 
months after deciding AT&T v. Microsoft, the Federal Circuit decided 
Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 
which dealt with the sale of a catalyst abroad for use in a patented chemical 
process.37  Using the rationale in Eolas and AT&T v. Microsoft, the Federal 
Circuit found that § 271(f) “makes no distinction between patentable 
method/process inventions and other forms of patentable inventions,” thus 
once again expanding the scope of § 271(f) to now include “components” of 
patented processes.38  
¶7 Of these recent cases in which the Federal Circuit has expansively 
interpreted § 271(f) and attached liability for conduct occurring wholly 
abroad, AT&T v. Microsoft alone now sits before the Supreme Court on 
grant of certiorari.   
                                                     
33 Id. at 1339.  Regarding policy, the court stated that it could not “construct a 
principled reason” to differentiate between different types of inventions.  Id.  
The court even discussed the TRIPS Agreement: “Patents shall be available and 
patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention[] 
[and] the field of technology . . . .”  Id. (quoting Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the 
Uruguay Round, Part II, Section 5, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 
1125, 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf). 
34 Id. at 1339. 
35 Id. (discussing Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 299 F. Supp. 2d 550, 
553 (E.D. Va. 2003)).
36 AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d  1366, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 
cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2006). 
37 Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d 
1366, 1369–72 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
38 Id. at 1379–80. 
2007 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 4 
II.  AT&T V. MICROSOFT: FACTS, LOWER COURT DECISIONS AND 
ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 
A. Facts 
¶8 Similar to Eolas’s action,39 AT&T’s suit against Microsoft is rooted 
in Microsoft’s practice of supplying software to its licensed foreign 
computer manufacturers via “golden master disks” or electronic 
transmission.40  The software in question is a version of the Microsoft 
Windows operating system utilizing a speech compression code; when 
installed on a computer, the speech compression code is protected by 
AT&T’s software patent 32,580.41  Microsoft writes and exports master 
copies of the software from the United States to various locations abroad,42 
where it is then copied and installed onto foreign-made computers for sale 
in foreign markets.43  AT&T alleges that Microsoft is liable for 
infringement under § 271(f)44 both for its supply of the master copy of the 
software to its manufacturers abroad and for each of the subsequent copies 
of the software made and installed onto computers abroad by these 
manufacturers.45   
B. The District Court Proceedings 
¶9 Based on the facts above, AT&T filed suit against Microsoft for 
patent infringement for its sale of the Windows operating system utilizing 
AT&T’s speech codec in the United States and abroad.46  Microsoft 
countered by filing a motion in limine to exclude evidence of its foreign 
software sales.47  The parties agreed on a stipulation of the facts, and 
Microsoft moved for partial summary judgment of non-infringement under 
                                                     
39 See id. at 1325. 
40 AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1368. 
41 Id. at 1368 n.1 (“A ‘speech codec’ is a software program that codes a speech 
signal into a more compact form, and decodes it back into a signal that sounds 
like the original.”); see U.S. Patent No. 32,580 (filed Sept. 18, 1986) (reissued 
Jan. 1988).   
42 AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1373 (Rader, J., dissenting).  Microsoft sent 
the software code to Dusseldorf, Germany, and Tokyo, Japan, in addition to 
New York.  Microsoft only contests liability under § 271(f) for copies of the 
software made abroad by its foreign manufacturers and installed on foreign-
made computers.  Id. at 1369. 
43 Id. at 1368 (majority opinion); AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 
01CV4872, 2004 WL 406640, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004). 
44 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000). 
45 AT&T v. Microsoft, 2004 WL 406640, at *2.   
46 Id. at *1. 
47 AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1368. 
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§ 271(f).48  Microsoft argued (1) that the software encoded on the golden 
master disks and sent by electronic transmission was “merely ‘intangible 
information,’ and thus not a ‘component’ as contemplated by § 271(f),”49 
and (2) that it should not be liable under § 271(f) for copies of the software 
made and installed onto computers abroad because “the copies themselves 
[were] not ‘supplied from’ the United States.”50  Consistent with the 
Federal Circuit in Eolas, the District Court of the Southern District of New 
York interpreted § 271(f) broadly by holding that software could be a 
“component” under § 271(f) because “[t]here is no limitation on the term 
‘component,’ either in the statutory text or in the legislative history” of 
§ 271(f) and no indication that the term should be limited.51  The court then 
found that Microsoft “supplied” the software by sending the golden master 
disks abroad such that Microsoft was liable for patent infringement under 
§ 217(f) for software copies made abroad and installed on foreign-made 
machines.52  Microsoft entered into a settlement agreement for damages 
with AT&T after assenting to a stipulated judgment of liability but reserved 
the right to appeal the district court’s ruling on the § 271(f) issue.53 
C. The Appellate Court Proceedings 
¶10 Before the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Microsoft 
again argued in favor of a narrower scope of liability under § 271(f) and 
was again unsuccessful.54  First, relying on its holding in Eolas, the 
appellate court found software to be a “component” under § 271(f).55  
Because the software “being supplied is an actual component . . . not 
instructions to foreign software engineers for designing and coding [the 
software],” the court rejected Microsoft’s assertion that Pellegrini applied to 
the case.56  Then, turning to the issue of whether Microsoft had “supplied” 
                                                     
48 Id. 
49 AT&T v. Microsoft, 2004 WL 406640, at *2. 
50 Id.   
51 Id. at *5. 
52 Id. at *7 (“Microsoft seeks to equate replication of the object code abroad with 
the manufacturing or ‘supply’ of it from abroad.  Microsoft’s argument ignores 
the undisputed fact that the object code is originally manufactured in the United 
States, and supplied from the United States to foreign replicators or OEMs 
[original equipment manufacturers] with the intention of incorporating such 
software into foreign-assembled computers.”).
53 AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1368; Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae at 5, AT&T v. Microsoft, No. 05-1056 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2006), 2006 WL 
2805326 [hereinafter Government Brief]. 
54 AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1368–69, 1372. 
55 Id. at 1369; see supra Part I (discussing Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 
399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 568 (2005)).   
56 AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1370. 
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the software component from the United States within the meaning of 
§ 271(f) such that liability attached to the foreign-produced copies of the 
software, the court looked to the text of the statute and interpreted the term 
“supply” in a technology-dependent manner, basing its interpretation on the 
nature of software technology.57  The court found that “the act of copying 
[software] is subsumed in the act of ‘supplying’ [software] such that 
sending a single copy abroad with the intent that it be replicated invokes 
§ 271(f) liability for those foreign-made copies.”58  To support its holding, 
the court asserted that its interpretation of “supply” was consistent with the 
Congressional intent in enacting § 271(f)59 and that the interpretation was 
necessary for the statutory provision to remain effective.60  The court stated 
that any other interpretation of the statute would “subvert[] the remedial 
nature of § 271(f) [to close the loophole exposed by Deepsouth Packing], 
permitting a technical avoidance of the statute by ignoring the advances in a 
field of technology—and its associated industry practices—that developed 
after [§ 271(f)’s enactment].”61  Relying again on Eolas, the court refused 
to draw a distinction between Microsoft’s supplying the software via golden 
master disk and supplying the software via electronic transmission, and held 
that the software was “supplied” abroad within the meaning of § 271(f) by 
both methods of transmission.62  The court also was not persuaded by 
“Microsoft’s impassioned recitation of a parade of horribles that may befall 
the domestic software industry” if the court were to find Microsoft liable for 
infringement.63  The court was confident that “Congress intended that the 
language it enacted would be applied as [the court] . . . applied it.”64 
¶11 Judge Rader wrote a forceful dissent to the panel majority’s 
decision that was somewhat surprising in light of his opinion for the court in 
Eolas.65  While “agreeing that software may be a component of a patented 
invention,” he criticized the majority’s broad technology-dependent 
interpretation of “supply” in § 271(f) and its disregard for the territoriality 
of patent law in the international arena.66  Judge Rader refuted the majority 
assertion that a plain interpretation of § 271(f) includes “copying” within 
the meaning of “supplying” and that “copying” is subsumed in the act of 
                                                     
57 Id. at 1369–70. 
58 Id. at 1370. 
59 Id. at 1370; see supra Part I (discussing key cases interpreting § 271(f)). 
60 AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1371.   
61 Id.  
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 1372. 
64 Id. (discussing Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 576 
(1982)). 
65 Id. (Rader, J., dissenting). 
66 Id. at 1372–73, 1376. 
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“supplying” for software code.67  He stated that “[t]he act of supplying is 
separate and distinct from copying, reproducing, or manufacturing,”68 and 
that “[t]he only true difference between making and supplying software 
components and physical components is that copies of software components 
are easier to make and transport.”69  Judge Rader stressed that the ease with 
which infringement may occur for software code is an incorrect basis upon 
which to differentiate between patented inventions under § 271(f).70  As a 
result, Judge Rader found that the majority’s interpretation departed from 
the holding of Pellegrini requiring that components “supplied” from the 
United States actually physically exist in the United States.71  Because the 
software components that were installed on foreign-made computers abroad 
were foreign-made copies of the “supplied” master copy, those components 
were never in the United States.72  Additionally, interpreting § 271(f) in a 
technologically-dependent manner “ignores [the Federal Circuit’s] case law 
that refuses to discriminate based on the field of technology.”73   
¶12 Judge Rader also drew a clear line between acts that occur in the 
United States (“supply” of a master copy of the software to manufacturers 
in New York, Dusseldorf, and Tokyo) and acts that occurred abroad 
(“copying” of the software by foreign manufacturers and installation of the 
copies onto foreign-made computers).74  He found the majority’s 
interpretation of “supply,” as applying to foreign-made copies of software, 
to be an extraterritorial expansion of U.S. patent law, creating liability for 
acts done wholly abroad that, prior to this case, could incur liability only 
under the law of the country in which they occurred.75  Such a result 
                                                     
67 Id. at 1372–73. 
68 Id. at 1373. 
69 Id. at 1374. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 1374–75. 
72 Id. (quoting Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (“[Section 271(f)] applies only where components of a patented invention 
are physically in the United States and then either sold or exported . . . .”)).  
Judge Rader’s stance here is a little surprising in light of the Eolas decision, 
which he authored, because finding liability in Eolas necessarily implied a 
finding that the software copies replicated abroad from the golden master disks 
were supplied from the United States under § 271(f).  See Eolas Techs. Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 
568 (2005) (“[T]he software code on the golden master disk is not only a 
component, it is probably the key part of this patented invention.”). 
73 AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1374 (Rader, J., dissenting).   
74 Id. at 1373, 1375. 
75 Id. at 1373 (discussing Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 
U.S. 641, 650 (1915) (“The right conferred by a patent under our law is confined 
to the United States and its Territories and infringement of this right cannot be 
predicated on acts wholly done in a foreign country.”)). 
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contravenes the plain language of § 271(f) to “expressly limit[] liability . . . 
to activities occurring in the United States”76 and the precedent of both the 
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court with regard to the territorial nature 
of U.S. patent law.77  He emphasized that prior to the majority’s decision in 
AT&T v. Microsoft, companies could protect themselves from competitors 
copying and manufacturing their software technology in foreign markets 
only by “obtaining and enforcing foreign patents.”78 
D. On Grant of Certiorari to the Supreme Court 
1. Questions Presented 
¶13 Microsoft’s petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari was granted 
in October of 2006,79 and oral arguments were heard on February 21, 
2007.80  Microsoft presented two questions to the Court: “(1) Whether 
digital software code—an intangible sequence of ‘1’s’ and ‘0’s’—may be 
considered a ‘component[] of a patented invention’ within the meaning of 
Section 271(f)(1); and, if so, (2) Whether copies of such a ‘component[]’ 
made in a foreign country are ‘supplie[d]’ . . . from the United States.”81   
2. Microsoft’s Arguments 
¶14 Microsoft presented two theories under which the Court could 
conclude that software is not a “component” within the meaning of 
§ 271(f).82  First, Microsoft argued that the Court could avoid deciding 
“whether software can ever be a ‘component of a patented invention’ within 
the meaning of Section 271(f),” by narrowly deciding whether the “golden 
master discs” and electronic transmissions of the software code themselves 
were components of the allegedly infringing devices manufactured 
abroad.83  Microsoft, relying on the stipulated facts, asserted that it was 
undisputed that the “golden master discs,” the code encoded thereon, the 
electronic transmissions, and the code therein, were not components of any 
allegedly infringing computers sold abroad; only copies of the code sent 
from the United States were encoded onto foreign-made computers sold 
                                                     
76 Id. at 1374. 
77 Id. at 1373–74. 
78 Id. at 1376. 
79 AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. 467 (2006) (grant of petition for 
certiorari).
80 Oral Argument, AT&T v. Microsoft, No. 05-1056 (U.S. argued Feb. 21, 2007).   
81 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, AT&T v. Microsoft, No. 05-1056 (U.S. Feb. 
17, 2006), 2006 WL 403897 [hereinafter Certiorari Petition]. 
82 Brief for Petitioner at 34–44, AT&T v. Microsoft, No. 05-1056 (U.S. Dec. 15, 
2006), 2006 WL 3693463 [hereinafter Petitioner Brief]. 
83 Id. at 34. 
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abroad.84  Microsoft’s second argument was that binary software code 
lacking a physical existence (i.e., not encoded in a physical media) is not a 
“component” under § 271(f) because (1) such sequence “is design 
information, analogous to product specifications or a recipe,” which can be 
used to make a product but is not itself a component of the product, and (2) 
such a sequence “is incapable of being ‘combined’ with other components . 
. .  to practice the invention” as it is neither readable nor executable by a 
computer and thus cannot direct a computer “to function as the device 
claimed in the patent.” 85   
¶15 For the second question presented—whether copies of software 
made abroad can be supplied from the U.S for the purposes of § 271(f)—
Microsoft had two main arguments.  First, Microsoft claimed that under a 
plain reading of the statute its conduct should not incur liability under 
§ 271(f).86  Microsoft also maintained that both the majority and the dissent 
of the Federal Circuit panel and AT&T itself recognized that the software 
code installed on foreign-made computers were copies created by foreign 
manufacturers abroad and not actually supplied from the U.S by 
Microsoft.87  Thus, Microsoft argued that the Federal Circuit’s majority 
erred in conflating “copying” with “supplying” specifically for software 
inventions.88  Microsoft indicated that such an interpretation was also 
impermissible in the absence of Congressional intent that software should 
be treated differently under the patent laws than other types of inventions.89  
Thus, to apply § 271(f) consistently to all types of inventions, liability 
cannot attach to the foreign-made software copies because the physical 
embodiment of the software code on the foreign-made copies was not the 
“very same” physical embodiment of the master code supplied by 
Microsoft; the copies were not created in the United States.90 
¶16 Also with respect to the second question before the Court, 
Microsoft focused on how statutory principles of construction prohibit an 
                                                     
84 Id. at 35. 
85 Id. at 38. 
86 Id. at 14–15. 
87 Id. at 15–17, 23. 
88 Id. at 18–19 
89 Id. at 20–23. 
90 Id. at 24–26.  Microsoft drew an analogy between current modes of storing 
software code (e.g., DVDs, CDs, hard drives) and player piano music rolls and 
early computer punch-card technology; each being a physical embodiment of 
instructions to tell a device how to function.  Id. at 23–25.  Microsoft argued 
that, if the software code in the case at hand was embodied on punch-cards 
instead of on CDs or DVDs, it would be obvious that the copies of the software 
made abroad for use with foreign-made computers truly were not supplied from 
the United States.  Id. at 25. 
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expansive reading of the provision.91  Microsoft argued that Congress did 
not intend to reach circumstances such as that presented here (i.e., where 
foreign-made copies are combined abroad); rather, “mak[ing] no mention of 
copies,” Congress “prohibited the supply of ‘components’ where ‘such 
components’—that is, the originals—may be combined overseas.”92  In 
light of this, Microsoft asserted that the Federal Circuit was acting in a 
legislative manner “to ensure that Section 271(f) ‘remain[s] effective,’” 
which raised separation of powers issues.93  Furthermore, the presumption 
against extraterritorial application of U.S. law—arising out of comity, the 
territoriality of U.S. law, and separation of powers—limits the reach of 
§ 271(f) and prohibits a statutory interpretation that would enable 
extraterritorial effects.94 
3. AT&T’s Arguments 
¶17 In response to Microsoft, AT&T first raised procedural arguments.  
AT&T maintained that, if the proper question before the Court was the 
narrower question of whether the golden master disk and electronic 
transmission of the software code themselves were components of the 
devices manufactured abroad, then the Court should dismiss the writ as 
improvidently granted.95  Alternatively, AT&T asserted that the argument is 
“neither preserved nor correct” and is thus waived because Microsoft did 
not raise it in the courts below or in its petition for certiorari.96  
¶18 AT&T’s interpretation of the term “component” within the meaning 
of § 271(f) encompassed both the physical and intangible parts of a 
system.97  AT&T pointed out that “component” means “‘a constituent part’ 
or ‘ingredient’” and is not limited to physical parts of a system or device.98  
Additionally, the term “component” is “routinely used to describe software 
independent of any physical format, whether as part of a computer system 
consisting of both hardware and software or as part of a larger non-physical 
software program.”99 AT&T reasoned that Congress could have chosen to 
limit the scope of § 271(f) to physical components of a patented invention 
in the language of the statute but did not because “[i]ntangible ‘[software] 
code . . . is not only a component,’ but [is] ‘the key part’ of virtually any 
                                                     
91 Id. at 26–33. 
92 Id. at 27–28. 
93 Id. at 29 (citation omitted). 
94 Id. at 29–30. 
95 Brief for Respondent at 17, AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-1056 
(U.S. Jan. 2007), 2006 WL 789602 [hereinafter Respondent Brief]. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 19. 
98 Id. (citations removed). 
99 Id. at 20. 
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invention practiced through software.”100  Thus, AT&T asserted that “if 
object code as such did not qualify as a ‘component’ of such products, 
Section 271(f) would have no meaningful application to the software 
industry,” which could not have been the intent of Congress.101   
¶19 AT&T supported its statutory interpretation by arguing that 
“[o]bject code is an essential component of software technology even if it 
must be combined with physical components to function” and further 
reasoned that intangible software code is like any other component that has 
no utility on its own and needs to be combined with another component to 
yield a functional device.102  AT&T stated that “combining intangible 
object code with physical components such as a hard drive or CD to make 
software technology work within a variety of computer systems” reflects the 
“basic structure of modern computer technology.”103  As such, for software 
it does not make sense to try and distinguish “instructions” from patented 
“product” because “the product is a machine that contains and continuously 
performs the ‘instructions’ expressed in object code.”104 
¶20 Based on the above arguments, AT&T maintained that Microsoft 
did supply intangible object code from the United States for combination 
with other components abroad and is thus liable under § 271(f) for the 
foreign-made copies combined with foreign-made computers.105  Disputing 
Microsoft’s arguments regarding “supply” of components from the United 
States, AT&T pointed out that Microsoft’s position is based on incorrect 
reasoning regarding whether software code is a “component.”106   
¶21 Finally, AT&T found no solid policy reason to disregard the plain 
meaning of the statute and exclude intangible components from within the 
scope of § 271(f).107  AT&T asserted that Microsoft’s arguments would 
essentially amount to a repeal of § 271(f) with regards to software 
components, creating a special exception in the patent laws amongst 
technologies for software and leaving software inventors in the United 
States open to free-riding abroad.108  In practice, Microsoft’s position would 
mean that only the copy of the software embodied on a physical medium 
                                                     
100 Id. at 22 (quoting Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1339 
(Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 568 (2005)). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 23. 
103 Id. at 24. 
104 Id. at 28. 
105 Id. at 28, 32–33. 
106 Id. at 28–30. 
107 Id. at 36. 
108 Id. at 37–41.  AT&T points out that U.S. companies can avoid liability by 
sending instructions as to how to write the software code abroad, as opposed to 
sending the complete code itself.  Id. at 36–37. 
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and sent abroad could be considered a “component” under § 271(f); thus, 
there would be no liability for any software installed on a computer abroad 
after being shipped from the United States.109  Additionally, AT&T 
reasoned that the presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply 
because (1) the conduct at issue did occur in the United States (Microsoft 
“ship[ed] its U.S.-developed, U.S.-tested Windows software from the 
United States” abroad),110 (2) the presumption “operates only to break 
interpretive ties when a statute is ambiguous as to its geographic scope,” 
which was not the case here,111 (3) § 271(f) was created to overcome the 
presumption in situations defined by the statute’s plain language,112 (4) 
Microsoft did not cite any authority that application of § 271(f) to its 
conduct runs counter to any foreign nation’s policy,113 and (5) Congress 
enacted § 271(f) so that U.S. patent holders would not need to seek foreign 
patent protection or redress for infringement abroad.114  AT&T concluded 
that it is up to Congress to alter the balance it has set between U.S. patent 
holders and component suppliers, innovation and competition.115 
4. Amicus Curiae Briefs 
¶22 Amicus curiae briefs were submitted by representatives of different 
industries, academics and practitioners, and the Court solicited the opinion 
of the Department of Justice.116  While the briefs contained arguments both 
for and against the inclusion of software within the term “component” under 
§ 271(f), where addressed, they almost unanimously disagreed with the 
Federal Circuit’s disregard for the inherency of territoriality in U.S. 
                                                     
109 Id. at 39. 
110 Id. at 41. 
111 Id. at 42. 
112 Id. at 42–43. 
113 Id. at 44–46.   
114 Id. at 46.   
115 Id. at 47–49. 
116 The following parties have filed amicus curiae briefs with the Supreme Court 
for this appeal: Software & Information Industry Association (“SIIA”); Business 
Software Alliance (“BSA”); Amazon.com, Inc. et al.; Yahoo! Inc.; Intel Corp.; 
Autodesk, Inc.; Shell Oil Co.; Intellectual Property Professors; Software 
Freedom Law Center (“SFLC”); Fédération Internationale Des Conseils en 
Propriété Industrielle (“FICPI”); the Solicitor General; American Intellectual 
Property Law Association (“AIPLA”); Eli Lilly, BayhDoyle25.inc; U.S. Philips 
Corp.; Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation et al.; Professor Edward Lee; 
Software Freedom Law Center; the Houston Intellectual Property Law Assoc., 
and the Patent, Trademark & Copyright Section of the District of Columbia. 
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intellectual property law as a part of the international intellectual property 
right system.117 
III.  35 U.S.C. 271(F) SHOULD BE INTERPRETED CONSERVATIVELY 
TO AVOID INTERNATIONAL DISCORD AND NATIONAL HARM 
A. Extraterritorial application of U.S. patent law will disrupt the 
comity-based international scheme of intellectual property rights.  
¶23 The presumption against extraterritoriality is a “longstanding 
principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary 
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States.’”118  The presumption “serves to protect against 
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations[,] which 
could result in international discord.”119  A cornerstone of this presumption 
is the doctrine of comity, which is defined as “[a] practice among political 
entities (as nations, states, or courts of different jurisdictions), involving 
esp[ecially] mutual recognition of legislative, executive, and judicial 
acts.”120  Comity reflects the respect of one sovereign nation for another. 
¶24 Comity considerations are a significant factor in all major 
international intellectual property treaties, including the Paris Convention121 
and TRIPS Agreement.122  The United States is a signatory of both these 
treaties.  A governing principle of these treaties arising out of comity is 
                                                     
117 Respondent Brief, supra note 95, at 46.  Of the amicus briefs filed that 
address the application of the presumption against extraterritorial to § 271(f), 
Microsoft, Intellectual Property Professors, SIIA, Intel, FICPI, Yahoo, and the 
United States support the application of the presumption, while 
BayhDoyle25.inc opposes it. 
118 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) 
(quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). 
119 Id. 
120 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 284 (8th ed. 2004).  The entry also quotes Hilton 
v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895) (“‘Comity,’ in the legal sense, is neither 
a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good 
will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its 
territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having 
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its 
own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.”).  Id.
121 Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 
21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention], available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/.  The treaty has been amended several 
times (most recently in 1979).   
122 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 33.   
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national treatment.123  National treatment is “[t]he policy or practice of a 
country that accords the citizens of other countries the same intellectual 
property protection as it gives its own citizens, with no formal treaty of 
reciprocity required.”124  National treatment “allows countries the autonomy 
to develop and enforce their own laws, while meeting the demands for 
international protection. Effectively, national treatment is a mechanism of 
international protection without harmonization.”125  Thus, the reliance on 
national treatment in these treaties has permitted nations to ensure 
protection for patentable inventions while maintaining independent patent 
law systems.126  This is in contrast to international copyright treaties where 
the trend has been towards harmonization.127  However, the national 
treatment principle is a core principle in international copyright treaties, and 
it maintains a strong presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. 
                                                     
123 See World Intellectual Property Organization, Summary of the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property (1883), 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/summary_paris.html (last visited Mar. 
25, 2007) (Applying broadly to all intellectual property rights, the Convention’s 
substantive provisions “fall into three main categories: national treatment, right 
of priority, [and] common rules.”); World Trade Organization, TRIPS: A More 
Detailed Overview of the TRIPS Agreement, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 
2007) (“[T]he Agreement provides for certain basic principles, such as national 
and most-favoured-nation treatment, and some general [procedural] rules . . . 
[and] requires Member countries to make patents available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology without 
discrimination, subject to the normal tests of novelty, inventiveness and 
industrial applicability.”).  The author benefited greatly from discussing this 
topic with Professor Reichman.   
124 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1054 (8th ed. 2004).  
125 Id. (quoting LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW 5 (Oxford Univ. Press, USA 2004) (2001)).
126 See Andrew J. Sherman, International Protection of Brands and Patents, 
KAUFFMAN EVENTURING, Aug. 1, 2006, 
http://www.eventuring.org/eShip/Redirect?key=Entrepreneurship/Resource/Res
ource_569.htm (discussing the international treaties that govern patent rights). 
127 See the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
(PARIS ACT) July 24, 1971, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986), 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 
 (entered into force Mar. 1, 1989)  available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/, for the primary treaty governing 
international copyright law requirements. This treaty has resulted in significant 
international harmonization of copyright protections.  Michael Trenholm and 
John Holcomb, International Intellectual Property Conventions, RIVERSIDE 
LAWYER, Sept. 2006, at 14, 15, available at 
http://riversidecountybar.com/barpubs/0609RL.pdf. 
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intellectual property laws.128  As such, the territorial nature of intellectual 
property law is implicit in the principles of comity and national 
treatment.129  Guided by these principles, the judiciary has largely avoided 
“act[ing] in a manner that might disrupt Congress’s efforts to secure a more 
stable international intellectual property regime unless Congress otherwise 
clearly has expressed its intent . . . [as such action] might well send the 
signal that the United States does not believe that the protection accorded by 
the laws of other member nations is adequate.”130 
¶25 The Federal Circuit’s ruling in AT&T v. Microsoft, expanding the 
interpretation of § 271(f) to encompass acts conducted outside the territorial 
limits of the United States, will disrupt this international scheme with 
regards to both software patent infringement and other areas of intellectual 
property right enforcement more generally.  For example, technology-
driven e-commerce, in which software plays a significant role, is an 
important aspect of today’s economy, both nationally and internationally.  
While software is protected in the United States and abroad by copyright 
law, patent protection for software is much less uniform.131  Software is 
patentable in the United States and Japan, but patentability in Europe varies 
from country to country.132  In fact, software patentability is a hotly-debated 
                                                     
128 See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Comm. Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 
1994) (en banc) (“[I]t is commonly acknowledged that the national treatment 
principle implicates a rule of territoriality.”).  The Court in Subafilms discusses 
how U.S. treaty obligations under the newly joined Berne Convention and newly 
created TRIPS Agreement influence its decision to interpret the Copyright Act 
conservatively.  Id. at 1097–1098.  The significance of this case in copyright law 
was pointed out to the author by Professor Reichman. 
129 See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972) 
(“Our patent system makes no claim to extraterritorial effect; ‘these acts of 
Congress do not, and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the 
United States,’ and we correspondingly reject the claims of others to such 
control over our markets.”) (citations omitted). 
130 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1097–98. 
131 See Fenwick & West LLP, 2006 Update: International Legal Protection for 
Software Chart Spring 2006, http://www.softwareprotection.com/chart.htm (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2007), for a general chart describing patent and copyright 
protection in different countries and applicable treaties, and World Intellectual 
Property Organization, Business Method and Computer Software Patents, 
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/e_commerce/computer_software.htm (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Business Method and Computer Software Patents], 
which generally describes the state of software patentability in the world.  
132  Fenwick & West LLP, International Legal Protection for Software, Patent 
Protection, http://www.softwareprotection.com/patent.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 
2007) [hereinafter International Legal Protection for Software]; Business 
Method and Computer Software Patents, supra note 131.  These articles discuss 
how, despite the fact that software is patentable under the European Patent 
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issue in the European Union on which member states have yet to reach a 
consensus.133  Because the state of patent protection for software is 
unsettled in Europe, the imposition of U.S. patent law abroad, particularly 
in a manner that creates protection for software, will cause “serious risk of 
interference with a foreign nation’s ability to regulate its own affairs.”134  
The extraterritorial reach of § 271(f) as interpreted by the Federal Circuit in 
AT&T v. Microsoft will also cause “difficult choice-of-law problems . . . 
that the federal courts’ general adherence to the territoriality principle 
largely has obviated [until now].”135  In addition, such protection under U.S. 
patent law may deter inventors from obtaining patents outside the United 
States for their inventions and thus “threatens to disrupt foreign nations’ 
patent law schemes.”136   
¶26 Importantly, comity and related principles of international law also 
support the position that § 271(f) should be repealed in its entirety, as 
suggested by recent patent reform bills.137  Even narrowly construed, 
                                                                                                                       
Convention, the national nature of patent prosecution and litigation in the 
European Union has resulted in variable software patent protection (patent 
issuance and enforcement) from country to country.  See also State St. Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(holding that a numerical calculation that produces a "useful, concrete and 
tangible result" is patentable). 
133 See Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, American-Style Patents Won’t Cross the 
Pond to EU, EWEEK.COM, July 6, 2005, http://www.eweek.com (search 
“American-style patents”; then follow article hyperlink); Software Patent Bill 
Thrown Out, BBC NEWS, July 6, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4655955.stm.  These articles describe the 
controversial Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions, COM (2002) 
92 final (Feb. 20, 2002), available at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2002/com2002_0092en01.pdf, 
and its failure to be enacted by the European Parliament on July 6, 2005. 
134 See Certiorari Petition, supra note 81, at 28 (discussing how “subjecting 
foreign manufacturer’s to the requirements of U.S. patent law” will disrupt the 
intellectual property law systems of foreign nations); cf. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche 
Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) (discussing the presumption 
against extraterritoriality in the context of applying U.S. antitrust laws to 
conduct that occurs outside the United States). 
135 See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Comm. Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir. 
1994) (en banc). “Although the [copyright] treaties do not expressly discuss 
choice-of-law rules, it is commonly acknowledged that the national treatment 
principle implicates a rule of territoriality.”  Id. at 1097. 
136 Certiorari Petition, supra note 81, at 13. 
137 See Patents and Global Drug Development, PHARMA FOCUS ASIA, Feb. 2007, 
http://www.pharmafocusasia.com/magazine/previous_issue/coverstory.htm 
(“Since being introduced [on 8 June 2005], various substitutes of [H.R. 2795, 
the Patent Act of 2005] have been proposed in an attempt to reach agreement 
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§ 271(f) represents an extraterritorial measure in U.S. law.  It would be 
more in accordance with these principles for U.S. patent law to require the 
inventor of any given invention (e.g., a shrimp deveining machine) to apply 
for foreign patents where protection for the invention is desired abroad.  
Patent schemes vary from country to country and differences should be 
respected as reflecting the policy choices of sovereign nations.  Inventions 
that are patentable in one country may not be patentable in another for a 
variety of reasons (e.g., subject matter, date of invention or filing, etc.).  
Thus, the question arises as to why U.S. patent law should extend in these 
circumstances to provide patent protection against competitors in the United 
States while no protection can be obtained abroad.  AT&T argued that 
“Congress enacted Section 271(f) because it understood that foreign patent 
protections are sometimes weaker than their U.S. counterparts, and because 
it wished to spare U.S. patent-holders from the considerable expense of 
obtaining patent protections in dozens of foreign jurisdictions.”138  
However, this point of view is both out-of-date and directly counter to the 
principles underlying the significant international intellectual property 
treaties to which the United States has become a member since the 
enactment of § 271(f).139  The benefits of § 271(f) are also called into 
question when U.S. companies either face tremendous potential 
infringement liability, diminished competitiveness, or the choice of moving 
development and manufacturing operations outside of the United States.140 
B. Separation of powers supports the presumption against 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law. 
¶27 The Federal Circuit’s ability to disrupt the patent law schemes of 
foreign nations illustrates why the presumption against extraterritoriality 
also reflects the institutional roles and competence of the different branches 
                                                                                                                       
between interested parties.  One proposed substitute known as The Coalition 
Print was suggested by a coalition of major US corporations in September 2005.  
Section 6(b) of The Coalition Print would repeal 35 U.S.C 271.”); see also Brief 
of BSA as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 21–22,  AT&T Corp. v. 
Microsoft Corp., No. 05-1056 (U.S. Dec. 15, 2006) (pointing out that H.R. 2795, 
109th Cong. § 5 (2005) (proposing to amend § 271(f) to limit “component” to 
“tangible item[s] that [are themselves] combined physically with other 
components to create the combination that is alleged to infringe”), and S. 3818, 
109th Cong. § 5 (2006) (proposing an outright repeal of Section 271(f)), “evince 
a desire to ensure that software is on the same footing as other patentable 
material, and that it should receive neither increased scrutiny nor added 
protections.”).  The author is grateful to Professor Rai for pointing out this 
argument.   
138 Respondent Brief, supra note 95, at 46.   
139 See supra Part III.A.   
140 Certiorari Petition, supra note 81, at 20; infra Part III.C.2.   
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of the federal government.  Under the United States Constitution, the 
executive branch, with the consent of the Senate, has the power to enter into 
treaties, while the legislative branch has the power to regulate commerce.141  
By interpreting § 271(f) in a technology-dependent manner, the Federal 
Circuit moved liability for infringement of a U.S. patent into the realm of 
international law, affecting past and future trade negotiations and interfering 
with the functions of the other federal branches.142  As such, the Federal 
Circuit’s decision to interpret § 271(f) expansively is unwise because “the 
legislative and executive branches are much better equipped than the 
judiciary to evaluate the complex foreign policy considerations raised by the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law.”143  In addition, if Congress wants 
§ 271(f) to reflect the advances in software technology since its enactment, 
it can amend the statute; the judiciary should not take it upon itself to update 
the law through case interpretation.144  Thus, separation of powers and 
                                                     
141 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (Treaty Power), art. II, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce 
Clause).  
142 See Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195 (1856) (discussing how 
the power of Congress to “promote the progress of science and the useful arts” is 
“separate and distinct” from the power of the Executive to enter into treaties and 
the power of Congress to regulate commerce); Brief for FICPI as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 8–9, AT&T v. Microsoft, No. 05-1056 (U.S. Dec. 14, 
2006), 2006 WL 3805865 [hereinafter FICPI Brief] (arguing that the United 
States has the duty, as a signatory of the Paris Convention, “to adopt in 
accordance with its constitution, the measures necessary to ensure the 
application of this Convention” and that for “§ 271(f) to extend to foreign 
countries, there must be a special agreement between the United States and the 
foreign countries by treaty, not by unilateral act of Congress”); Petitioner Brief, 
supra note 82, at 31 (“The presumption against the extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law is especially strong in the patent context because the application of 
U.S. patent law to foreign commercial activity intrudes upon other nations’ 
intellectual property law systems and thereby creates a significant risk of 
international discord.”). 
143 Certiorari Petition, supra note 81, at 23 (discussing Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. 
v. Watermann S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (asserting that “the 
Judiciary has neither the aptitude, facilities nor responsibility” to make decisions 
affecting international relations)). 
144 See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530–31 (1972) 
(refusing to interpret § 271(f) expansively in the absence of a “clear and certain 
signal from Congress” because “the sign of how far Congress has chosen to go 
[to promote the progress of science and the useful arts] can come only from 
Congress”); AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 
2005), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2006) (Rader, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the policy of Deepsouth); Government Brief, supra note 53, at 14 
(giving the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 
2860 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1204 (2000)), as an example of 
intellectual property right legislation enacted by Congress to address the 
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institutional competence concerns weigh in favor of judicial restraint in 
interpreting § 271(f).145 
C. The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of § 271(f) will disrupt 
foreign relations and harm the national software industry. 
1. Foreign Relations 
¶28 Extraterritorial application of U.S. law dramatically elevates the 
risk of international discord due to the potential for interference with the 
intellectual property systems of other sovereign nations.146  By interpreting 
the term “supplying” to include “copying” for software technology in AT&T 
v. Microsoft, the Federal Circuit created liability for patent infringement 
under § 271(f) for acts conducted outside the United States.147  In so doing, 
the court imposed this country’s policy choice to provide patent protection 
for software on other countries.  The countries to which Microsoft shipped 
master copies of the software code, Germany and Japan, illustrate how this 
can be a problem.  As discussed above, patent protection for software is not 
a settled issue in Europe, and enforcement of software patents in Germany 
specifically is rarely successful.148  Additionally, patent protection for 
                                                                                                                       
technological advances of the digital era); Brief of Intel Corp. as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Petitioner at 15–16, AT&T v. Microsoft, No. 05-1056 (U.S. Dec. 
15, 2006) (discussing “the lesson of Deepsouth:” that “it is up to Congress, not 
the courts, to extend the territorial scope of U.S. patent law to address modern 
developments in technology and international trade”). 
145 See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978) (“It is our duty to construe the 
patent statutes as they now read in light of our precedents, and we must proceed 
cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly 
unforeseen by Congress.”). 
146 See F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) 
(discussing how the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law 
“helps the potentially conflicting laws of different nations work together in 
harmony”). 
147 AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1370. 
148 See Wendy M. Grossman, Euro Software Patents Pending, WIRED NEWS, 
Mar. 19, 2005, http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,66938,00.html 
(describing how software patents granted by the European Patent Office have 
not been enforced in Germany); Wikipedia, Software patents under the 
European Patent Convention, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_patent_under_the_European_Patent_Con
vention (naming the German Federal Court cases rejecting “monopoly claims to 
computers and programs operating thereon”) (as of Apr. 2, 2007, 12:30 EST); R. 
G. C. Jenkins & Co., Computer Program Inventions Before the German 
Supreme Court—A Brief Summary,  
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software in Japan has also recently come into question.149  The 
extraterritorial application of § 271(f) thus brings U.S. law into direct 
conflict with the intellectual property schemes of other nations and can 
affect the ability of foreign governments to regulate their own affairs as they 
see fit.150  Such exportation of U.S. law could thereby disrupt American 
foreign relations and negatively impact future international negotiations.151  
Furthermore, enforcing U.S. law within foreign jurisdictions may provoke 
retaliation by the countries affected.152  Such retaliation could include the 
expansion of foreign laws to encompass activities within the United States, 
diminished comity towards U.S. law, and even reduction in trade 
relations.153 Thus, an expansive reading of § 271(f) by the judiciary not only 
risks harming the standing of the United States in the international arena, 
but also could destabilize the international scheme of intellectual property 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.jenkins-ip.com/serv/serv_10.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2007) 
(summarizing key software patent cases where patentability of software requires 
the invention to be of “a technical nature”). 
149 See Emma Barraclough, Japan’s Top IP Judges Overturn Panasonic Patent, 
MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEWS, Oct. 1, 2005, 
http://www.managingip.com (search for “Japan Panasonic Patent”; then follow 
hyperlink for article) (discussing the Japanese Intellectual Property High Court 
invalidation of Panasonic’s software patent in an infringement suit, despite the 
fact that Japan is typically considered to be much in line with the United States 
regarding the patentability of software). 
150 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. in Support of Petitioner at 18, AT&T 
v. Microsoft, No. 05-1056 (U.S. Dec. 15, 2006), 2006 WL 3723904 [hereinafter 
Yahoo Brief] (“These nations are actively engaged in deciding how and under 
what circumstances software should be patentable.  Interference with their 
carefully made decisions in unlikely to be eagerly welcome.”). 
151 See Brief for Amicus Curiae Bar of D.C., Patent, Trademark & Copyright 
Section in Support of Neither Party at 10, AT&T v. Microsoft, No. 05-1056 (U.S. 
Dec. 15, 2006), 2006 WL 3740356 (“Regardless of whether a violation of 
TRIPS has occurred, the Federal Circuit should be cognizant of possible 
missteps that would cause the United States to suffer international 
repercussions.”); World Intellectual Property Organization, Substantive Patent 
Law Harmonization, http://www.wipo.int/patent/law/en/harmonization.htm (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2007) (describing the current drafting of the Substantive Patent 
Law Treaty); FICPI Brief, supra note 142, at 20 (discussing the failure of the 
European Union’s proposed Directive on software patentability and the  
impasse of the international negotiations over the Substantive Patent Law 
Treaty, partly due to the scope of software patentability). 
152 Certiorari Petition, supra note 81, at 28–29.  While AT&T v. Microsoft only 
deals with Microsoft’s activities in Japan and Germany, the impact of the 
Federal Circuit’s interpretation of § 271(f) will reach all foreign markets. 
153 Id. 
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rights.154  To avoid these problems, a company wanting to protect its 
foreign market shares from competitors must look to the patent law of those 
countries and, where protection is unavailable (i.e., software is not 
patentable or protection is not enforced), such companies must abide by the 
policy choices of those sovereign nations and not look to U.S. patent law for 
protection.   
2. Domestic Economic Harm 
¶29 In addition to its international effects, the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of § 271(f) will also likely result in significant harm to the 
U.S. software industry.155  American companies will be competitively 
disadvantaged abroad due to the fact that they, unlike their foreign 
competitors, are potentially exposed to expansive secondary liability for 
infringement under § 271(f) for their activities abroad.156  The potential for 
liability is significant because the U.S. software industry has accumulated 
huge numbers of software patents.157  Because the practice of shipping 
master copies of software abroad for manufacturing purposes was a 
permissible activity prior to the Federal Circuit’s holding, American 
companies who have followed this practice are also now subject to what is 
essentially a de facto compulsory licensing scheme by the ex post 
application of the Federal Circuit’s new expansive reading of § 271(f).158  
                                                     
154 See discussion supra Part III.A; see also JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, 
SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION 
SOCIETY 3 (Harvard University Press 1997) (1996) (discussing how the United 
States has become the world's most vigorous and effective champion of 
strengthened intellectual property rights).  By interfering with the intellectual 
property regimes of other nations, the United States harms its reputation as 
champion of intellectual property rights. 
155 See Brief Amici Curiae of Intellectual Property Professors in Support of 
Reversal at 11–12, AT&T v. Microsoft, No. 05-1056 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2006), 2006 
WL 3740618. 
156 Id. 
157 See Certiorari Petition, supra note 81, at 20 (discussing “the looming threat 
of crippling global liability” U.S. companies face and the high risk due to the 
“thousands of unexploited patents that comprise the ‘modern patent thicket’”).   
158 See AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 
cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2006) (Rader, J., dissenting) 
(discussing how, prior to AT&T v. Microsoft, companies needed to seek 
protection for inventions abroad under the laws of other countries); Certiorari 
Petition, supra note 81, at 20, 22 (discussing the “daunting and unforeseen” 
potential infringement damages U.S. companies now face and how this 
“jeopardizes the billions of dollars of investments that American high-
technology business have made in overseas manufacturing facilities”).  The 
Federal Circuit’s interpretation of § 271(f) would create a situation much like a 
de facto compulsory licensing system because companies like Microsoft, who 
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The extent of liability that such companies will incur if prosecuted will be 
unexpected and financially detrimental and, as a result, may drive many 
companies out of business.159  In addition, the threat of such liability may 
force companies within the United States to relocate their research and 
development divisions outside the United States to avoid liability, and it 
could deter new technology-businesses from locating operations within the 
United States in the first place.160  The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of 
“supplies” also opens the door to expanded liability in the semiconductor, 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries as well.161 
                                                                                                                       
developed business models using foreign manufacturers to copy software for 
foreign markets, in reliance on the state of the law prior to AT&T v. Microsoft, 
will be forced now to either license the software for use abroad, risk liability for 
infringement under § 271(f), or incur the heavy costs of redesigning their 
business models.   
159 Certiorari Petition, supra note 81, at 22.  American companies that have such 
foreign manufacturing facilities will not have considered this liability in their 
foreign investment calculations and now may incur significant costs in changing 
their business strategy.  Such companies also did not have the opportunity to 
negotiate better licensing terms than will be imposed by the courts.  An example 
of the potential damages that can arise from expansive liability under § 271(f) is 
the recent verdict against Microsoft for $1.52 billion in damages for 
infringement (in the United States and abroad) of two software patents held by 
Lucent-Alcatel: this is the largest damages award for patent infringement to 
date.  See Special Verdict Form, Lucent Techs. Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. (2007) 
(No. 02cv2060-B(CAB)), available at 
http://www.casd.uscourts.gov/casd/filerev.nsf/a4224145c26d1ccb88256913007f
6e67/eaddc4a24ae1242d8825728b00047562?OpenDocument; Jeff St. Onge and 
Bill Callahan, Microsoft Told to Pay Alcatel-Lucent $1.52 Billion (Update 7), 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 22, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com (search “Search 
News” for “Alcatel-Lucent”; then follow article hyperlink). 
160 Certiorari Petition, supra note 81, at 22.   
161 See Certiorari Petition, supra note 81, at 21 (discussing how the Federal 
Circuit’s expansive interpretation of ‘component’ of a patented invention opens 
the door to liability in the semiconductor and biotechnology industries); Brief of 
SIIA as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18–19, AT&T v. Microsoft, No. 
05-1056, 2006 WL 3740362 [hereinafter SIIA Brief]; Patents and Global Drug 
Development, PHARMA FOCUS ASIA, Feb. 2007, 
http://www.pharmafocusasia.com/magazine/previous_issue/coverstory.htm.  In 
the face of such open-ended liability, there have been moves in Congress to 
amend and repeal § 271(f); see also supra text accompanying notes 137–40.
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD STRIKE DOWN THE FEDERAL 
CIRCUIT’S EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF § 271(F) IF SOFTWARE 
IS A “COMPONENT” OF A PATENTABLE INVENTION 
¶30 The first issue before the Supreme Court is “[w]hether software 
object code can be a component of a patented invention” within the 
meaning of § 271(f).”162  There are strong arguments on both sides of this 
issue, and it rests with the Court to direct future application of Title 35 to 
software.163  Only if the Court concludes that software code can be a 
“component” under § 271(f) will it reach the second issue presented: 
“[w]hether copies of such software object code are ‘supplie[d]’ from the 
United States when those copies are created overseas by replicating a 
separate master version supplied from the United States.”164  If the Supreme 
Court does reach this second issue, it should strike down the Federal 
Circuit’s software-specific interpretation of “supply” within the context of 
§ 271(f) as contrary to the presumption against extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law. 
¶31 In construing § 271(f), the Court should “assume that Congress 
legislates against the backdrop of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.”165  According to the general rules of statutory 
construction, the Court should look first to the text of the statute and then to 
the legislative history.166  In considering whether to apply the presumption, 
the Court should assess these sources to determine whether Congress has 
expressed a clear intent for the statute to have extraterritorial effects.  In the 
absence of clearly expressed Congressional intent, “as long as ‘the statute’s 
language reasonably permits an interpretation consistent with’ the general 
presumption that Congress seeks to avoid interference with other nations’ 
sovereignty, a court ‘should adopt [that interpretation]’” even if it is not the 
                                                     
162 Government Brief, supra note 53, at I. 
163 See, e.g.,Yahoo Brief, supra note 150, at 8–9 (software code on the golden 
master disks is a form of instructions that, when installed on computers, creates 
a component); SIIA Brief, supra note 161, at 9 (“[A] ‘component’ . . . in the 
context of computer code must refer to the particular instance of the computer 
code that is downloaded onto, and thus physically part of, an accused computer 
system.”); Government Brief, supra note 53, at 7–10 (Software is not 
“intangible information” because it has a physical presence; software can be a 
component because it can be “a part, element or ingredient of a patented 
invention.”).   
164 Government Brief, supra note 53, at I.  In the author’s opinion, the court is 
likely to answer the first question in the affirmative based on its own and the 
Federal Circuit’s software patent jurisprudence.  
165 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
166 See AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1369–71 (Fed. Cir. 
2005), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2006). 
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more natural reading.167  Thus, if it is possible to interpret a statute without 
causing the law to have extraterritorial effects, the Court should do so where 
Congress has not clearly indicated that the law should have such effects.  
Comity considerations and the territorial nature of patent law compel this 
approach.168 
¶32 The language of § 271(f) is, on its face, general and technology-
neutral.  Because the term “supply” is not defined in Title 35, it should be 
interpreted as having its “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”169  
As Judge Rader indicated, “‘suppl[ying]’ . . . does not include ‘copying,’ 
‘replicating,’ or ‘reproducing’—in effect ‘manufacturing.’”170  Copying “is 
a separate and distinct act” from “suppl[ying].”171  This ordinary 
interpretation of the term “supplies” is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s 
practice of applying U.S. patent law in a technology-neutral manner and 
even with the majority’s rationale in AT&T v. Microsoft for interpreting the 
term to encompass “copying.”172  It is clear from § 271(f)’s twenty-year-old 
legislative history that the provision was primarily enacted to close the 
patent-infringement loophole exposed in Deepsouth Packing.173  While 
§ 271(f) may have been a remedial measure to stop-gap this loophole, 
“[n]othing in § 271(f) or its enacting documents expresses an intent to 
attach liability to manufacturing activities occurring wholly abroad” or an 
intent that the statute be interpreted in a technology-dependent manner.174  
Thus, Judge Rader was correct in interpreting “supply” within the scope of 
§ 271(f) in a more accurate and technology-neutral manner such that 
providing one copy of a software code abroad would not cause liability for 
                                                     
167 Petitioner Brief, supra note 82, at 30 (quoting F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. 
Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 174 (2004)) (citations omitted). 
168 See Certiorari Petition, supra note 81, at 24 (discussing how “[e]ven where 
Congress has unequivocally expressed its intention to give a U.S. law 
extraterritorial effect, the parameters of that authority must be strictly construed 
in light of the general presumption against extraterritoriality”). 
169 AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1369 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 
420, 431 (2000)). 
170 Id .at 1372 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 1374.  Judge Rader points out that the majority’s interpretation of 
“supplies” was based on the ease with which software code can be copied and 
transported, not on the principle that the two acts are the same thing. 
173 See id. (discussing 130 Cong. Rec. 28069 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) 
(Congressional debate on Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
622, 98 Stat. 3383) (“This proposal responds to the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Deepsouth Packing . . . concerning the need for a legislative solution 
to close a loophole in patent law.”); see also supra text accompanying notes 11–
15.   
174 AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1375 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
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any subsequent copies made that are combined with computers to create 
what would be infringing devices in the United States.   
¶33 Judge Rader’s interpretation, “accord[ing] the same treatment to all 
forms of invention,” is consistent with prior § 271(f) jurisprudence, and 
avoids irritating comity.175  In addition, the significant burden that has been 
imposed on the U.S. software industry can also be avoided by not attaching 
liability to foreign-made copies of software.  These factors, coupled with 
the lack of Congressional intent for § 271(f) to have extraterritorial effects, 
weighs heavily in favor of Judge Rader’s interpretation.176  By interpreting 
§ 271(f) in a technology-neutral manner, the Court will protect U.S. 
standing in the international intellectual property stage and leave AT&T 
with exactly the same remedies it had for redress before it brought suit: 
foreign patent protection.177  If AT&T wants to protect its foreign markets 
from competitors, it must accord with the laws of those countries to obtain 
patents on its technology.  However, in markets where patent protection for 
software is unavailable, AT&T must abide by the law and policy choices of 
those sovereign nations and not look to U.S. patent law to obtain 
protection.178 
CONCLUSION 
¶34 The facts in AT&T v. Microsoft illustrate the challenges that 
technological advancements pose on the territoriality of U.S. patent law.  
Supreme Court precedent, however, dictates that the presumption against 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law should govern this issue.  The 
presumption restrains U.S. law in accordance with the principles of comity 
and national treatment so as to avoid conflicts between the laws of the 
                                                     
175 See id. at 1372, 1376.  This interpretation is consistent with the Federal 
Circuit’s decisions in both Waymark Corp. v. Porta Systems Corp., 245 F.3d 
1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001), and Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 
1113, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2004), as there is no intent that master copies of the 
software shipped abroad be combined with foreign computers to create 
infringing devices; only the foreign-made copies of the software, which are not 
supplied from the United States, will be combined. 
176 See AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1376 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
177 See id. (discussing how the majority’s decision expanded the remedies 
available to patent holders to include liability for acts conducted abroad). 
178 See F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 166 (2004) 
(“Why is it reasonable to apply [U.S.] law to conduct that is significantly foreign 
insofar as that conduct causes independent foreign harm and that foreign harm 
alone gives rise to the plaintiff's claim?  We can find no good answer to the 
question.”); see also supra Parts III.A–B (discussing the principles of comity 
and national treatment and the separation of powers doctrine with respect to the 
presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. patent law). 
 
2007 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 4 
United States and those of other sovereign nations.  In AT&T v. Microsoft, 
the Federal Circuit failed to heed the Supreme Court’s application of this 
presumption in Deepsouth Packing and instead chose to interpret § 271(f) in 
a technology-dependent manner that encompassed copies of software code 
made abroad from U.S.-supplied master copies.  This interpretation 
broadens the scope of § 271(f) extraterritorially such that protection of 
software inventions from patent infringement can now be obtained under 
U.S. law irrespective of the jurisdiction in which the infringement occurs. 
Not only does the imposition of U.S. law into foreign jurisdictions upset the 
established international scheme of intellectual property rights and risk 
damaging the United States’ foreign relations, but the expansive liability 
under § 271(f) that now attaches to certain activities in software and other 
industries also threatens to diminish innovation and productivity within the 
United States. 
¶35 In reviewing AT&T v. Microsoft, it is likely that the Supreme Court 
will decide that software can be a component of a patented invention for the 
purposes of § 271(f), and thus will face the issue of how to interpret the 
term “supplies.”  In assessing this issue, the Court should look to its case 
law regarding the presumption against extraterritoriality.  Because 
Congressional intent regarding the applicability of § 271(f) to activities that 
occur outside the United States is unclear, the Court should interpret 
§ 271(f) in a manner that avoids extraterritorial effects: § 271(f) should be 
interpreted in a technology-neutral manner and should be applied only to 
conduct that occurs within the United States. 
